through massive propaganda. Writing on Stalin, Leonard Shapiro, the political scientist, stated,
The true object of propaganda is neither to convince nor even to persuade, but to produce a uniform pattern of public utterance in which the first trace of unorthodox thoughts reveals itself as a jarring dissonance. 1 Indeed, in Soviet Russia, dissent was regarded as lunacy; something similar can be said in our time about the EU, Maastricht, and the common currency (particularly during the latter's incubation and the first ten years of its life). Yet, clear spirits could see the dangers that at first hibernated but are now are on an explosive course.
At the time of the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, Martin Feldman, professor at Harvard and distinguished economist, wrote an article that castigated the agreement leading to the common currency. Feldman predicted not only economic but also political calamity if it came to pass.
2 It did pass and we all know that what followed years later has been a deep European debt crisis that proved Martin Feldman right.
A brief flashback will help bring to the reader's attention the building up of what I will call the El Dorado bubble. The El Dorado has been the euro, expected to bring riches to everyone. The race started with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978, which essentially was the work of Helmut Schmidt, the German chancellor, and Val é ry Giscard d'Estaing, the president of France, assisted by Roy Jenkins, president of the European Commission. A dozen years later, in 1990, Fran ç ois Mitterrand, the French president, and Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor, created the scenario of the next step to El Dorado: the European Monetary Union (EMU).
The themes originally addressed by the EMU saw the light in 1989 when a committee headed by Jacques Delors produced a document generally known as the Delors Report. This advocated a three-step development toward a common European currency. Maastricht generally followed these lines, but it also added its own twists and clauses.
Karl Otto P ö hl, then Bundesbank president and signatory of the Delors Report, had this to say on the eventual impact of the European Monetary Union: "If the idea spread and the German population understood what it is about-namely, that it centers on their money, and that decisions on it will be taken not by the Bundesbank but by a new institution-then I would imagine that considerable resistance would arise."
